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Article 5

Book Reviews
Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and
Proust by Paul de Man. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979.
Pp. xi + 305. $19.50.
Allegories of Reading, Paul de Man's latest book, is in many ways related
to his earlier collection of essays, Blindness and Insight. In the earlier work,
de Man showed how the principle underlying the work of several important
critics was capable of illuminating texts precisely because the critic was unaware
of a contradiction at the heart of the insight. Dc Man argued. for example, that
Georg Lukacs' itinerary in the Theory of tbe Novel sought to abolish the concept
of organicity from the novel while at the same time reinstating an organic
co:1ception through the mode of temporality which was used to elaborate the
supposedly non-organic theory. The insight which appears to abolish the
concept, and the insight that generates the brilliant readings of various novels,
thus only displaces the concept, leading to an inherent contradiction in the
reading.
Allegories of Reading is not based on thematic or critical principles, as
Blindness and Insigbt was, but instead it moves into a broader arena of contradiction as de Man investigates the relationship between grammar, the syntactic.
metonymic placement of signifiers in a chain, and rhetoric, the tropes that
are placed within the syntactic structure. The book begins by pointing out
that most of the recent work done in this area by writers like Todorov, Barthes
and Genette has assumed from the very beginning that rhetoric is only a part
of grammar and hence consonant with its rules. And since rhetoric is seen
only as a part of the grammar, the assumption of these writers is that once
the rules for the grammar have been developed, rhetoric will be accounted for
as well. For ·de Man, however, this consonance between rhetoric and grammar
needs to be called into question, and the result of such questioning is an
elaboration of the irony of understanding which places rhetoric and grammar
at odds much in the same way that the insight of critics seemed to be
contradicted by a blindness in de Man's earliest essays. His deconstructive
readings demonstrate that grammar and rhetoric undermine each other rather
than leading to understanding.
In using the terms "irony" and II deconstruction," de Man clearly places
his work within the post-structuralist tradition, but his deconstI'Uctions bear
the stamp of his own lucid writing. This is a text which continually undoes
the relationship between grammar and trope, which continually demonstrates
that the grammatical level is always deconstrUcted by the tropological level,
leading finally to the view that any text contradicts its own premises and at
the same time needs those premises to contradict itself and to reveal the contradiction. Through careful readings of Proust, Rilke, Nietzsche, and especially
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Rousseau, to whom the entire second half of the book is devoted, de Man
elaborates his view that "A literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the
authority of its own rhetorical mode ..." (17), regardless of whether one
attempts to ground the rhetoric in the grammar or the grammar in the rhetoric.
In one sense, the work of Allegories of Reading is devoted to pursuing the
lack of a ground within texts, a major theme of ,any deconstruction. Self,
author, grammar, rhetoric and so on are each seen to be concepts which continually displace rather than ground a given reading ::If a text. The result of
such readings is that all texts become fundamentally unreadable, hopelessly
locked into an uncontrolled irony whose displacements it is impossible to stop.
In another sense, though, de Man is also attempting to resolve some of the
gaps and contradictions in previous readings of figures like Nietzsche and Rousseau, In Nietzsche's case, this is done through readings which find a contradiction in his work between performative language and representational
language, a contradiction that does not appear only in the later work but
which is present from the very beginning of Nietzsche's career. The reading
then provides an important connection between early work like The Birth of
Tragedy and later texts like On the Genealogy of Morals. The readings of
Rousseau seek a deconstruction that accounts for the various philosophical,
literary and autobiographical texts which unite them in their contradiction.
Thus, each It essay" in the text offers new approaches to the figures under
consideration and at the same time calls into question the readability of such
work, and both are carefully and brilliantly evoked,
A brief glance at the commentary on Rousseau will indicate the position de
Man outlines. The problem is :first located in the Discourse on the Origins
and the Foundations Of Inequality among Men, a text that is problematic
because it seems to blend both fiction and history in an inconsistent manner,
leaving the reader unsure of its status-half seems devoted to a denominative
history, half to a tropological fiction about human perfectability. The problem
here is that it becomes "impossible to say whether denomination is literal or
figural: from the moment there is denomination, the conceptual metaphor of
entity as difference is implied, and whenever there is metaphor, the literal
denomination of a particular entity is inevitable..." (148). And since the
denomination, beginning with II man," is ultimately to lead to a political model
as well, one must conclude ,that Rousseau's idea of the "political destiny of
man is structured like and derived from a linguistic model that exists independently of nature and independently of the subject.. ," (156), Instead of
basing his political model o'n the state of nature, then, Rousseau actually bases it
on a linguistic model, and the negative aspects of social institutions thus parallel
the confusion between literal and metaphorical language that is at the center
of any linguistic system: the" circular, self-destructive pattern of all civil institutions mirrors the self-destructive epistemology of conceptual language when
it demonstrates its inability to keep literal reference and figural connotation
apart" (158). De Man's argument is more complex and detailed than this, but
the basic point is simply that the political and the linguistic in Rousseau are
both based on the inability properly to sepal."ate the literal from the metaphorical,
leading to abuse within both networks.
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The Second Discourse, then, reveals the deconstructive principle inherent
in all cognitive discourse: "it always has to be about an entity such as 'mao'
in which the noun is a conceptual metaphor that replaces a delusive play
between identity and difference" (160). Dc Man then proceeds to discuss
other works of Rousseau and to demonstrate how this principle undoes the
self/other polarity and those other dichotomies through which we try to order
and ground OUI world. "\Nith respect to reading itself, we find that "The
paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of figures) and its
deconstruction. But since this model cannot be closed off by a final reading.
it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural superposition which narrates
the unreadability of the prior narration" (205). vVe are caught between
"allegorical narratives" which "tell the story of the failure to read" and
"tropological narratives" which "tell the story of the failure to denominate"
(205). What de Man shows us in each of his chapters on Rousseau is how the
same aporia occurs regardless of the concept or the figure involved. Though
at various times it is "judgment," "will" or "freedom" which is being considered, the result is always the same: the concept "operates deconstructively
as a principle of differentiation but then, because of the referentiality inherent
in the linguistic model, reintegrates by an act of the mind what it had taken
apart on the level of intuition" (240). The unifying principle in Rousseau's
work is that it always functions in terms of this necessary confusion between
literal and metaphorical.
The object of Allegories o[ Reading is thus on the one hand to provide a
commentary which deals '\vith presumed differences and problems inherent in the
criticism of each of the texts under consideration, revealing a coherence in
the reading, and on the other hand to demonstrate that the coherence is finally
a variation on the same theme: "There can be no text without grammar: the
logic of grammar generates texts only in the absence of referential meaning, but
every text generates a referent that subverts the grammatical principle to whioh
it owed its constitution" (269). In these terms, de IVlan's work is surely
successful, and the clarity of his presentation adds to the value of the writing.
His abject refusal to offer a general conclusion is curious, since the implication
of the text is that the deconstructive enterprise is germaine not only to Rilke,
Proust, Nietzsche and Rousseau but to all writing, and a summary of "the
systematic undoing... of understanding" (301) would be most helpful. Nevertheless, the carefully wrought network of the reading works well enough on its
own and provides irs own justification. If it is true that all deconstructions take
place in the readings themselves, one would still like to know how de Man's
deconstructive itinerary differs from the work of Derrida and the other poststructuralists. AllegoTies of Reading certainly fits into this tradition, and it is
also one of the better examples of such work, but the readings, while excellent
in themselves, seem not to extend the principles of deconstruction very far,
though they clearly put them to good use.
JAMES

Kenyon CoUege

S.

HANS
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Satire's Persuasive Voice by Edward A. Bloom ,and Lillian D. Bloom. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1979. Pp. 305. $15.00.
The authors of this book say the progress of their work U at times was as
intricate and hazardous as a journey through the Wnoan labyrinth." In a
hook whose jacket declares it to be "engagingly written," as well as both
" literate and urbane," such phraseology nevertheless smacks a bit of the high-flown
and pretentious. And does the blurb writer of a university press book nowadays
feel the need to commend a professorial study for being "literate"? Apparently
we have come to such a pass.
I start with the language of Satire's Persuasive Voice because it so frequently
distracts and bothers me, and I start with two examples. In the first (p. 103),
the authors maintain that Swift's II grimly circumscribed vision of London in
A Description of a City Shower includes physical and spiritual degradation, moral
filth and smells, the detritus of wasted li~es and hopes:
Sweepings from butchers' stalls, dung, guts, and blood,
Drown'd puppies, stinking sprats, all drench'd in mud,
Dead cats and turnip-tops come tumbling down the flood."
Swift certainly here specifies, as the authors claim, "the grossness of reality,"
but I nevertheless fail to see any "spiritual degradation," any "moral filth and
smells," any so-called" detritus of wasted lives and hopes" (except possibly the
~ves and hopes of cats, cattle, dogs and sprats), either in these lines or in the
rest of the poem (in spite of the strained efforts of critics other than the
Blooms to turn Swift's poem into some kind of divine mal~diction on the
humankind of London). What I do see is adjectival language raised to empty
display, and if it is not downright wrong and misleading, it is certainly not
supported by evidence or analysis. Again, take the occasion (pp. 218, 220-21)
when the authors describe the use of "the beast metaphor, through which
human shortcomings are placed in an animal context or are viewed by animals
with a clarity denied to erring man," and where they arrive at a conclusion
that to me somehow manages to be, by turns, truistic, jejune, canting:
As is true of all satire, however, the dramatically exaggerated [beast]
metaphors should not be insisted upon as the satirist's literal understanding of the world. Rather, some commOll objective ground exists
upon which we may be able to come to terms with animal satire even
as provocative as that we have just seen [in Butler, Swift, Addison].
All three .•. share at least these attitudes: that communal man has
failed; that his social and political institutions no longer reflect the
best of which the human spirit and will are capable.

To point up the questionable rhetoric, and the occasional questionable conclusions, in this book is not to deny the intellectual vigor and breadth also
exhibited in the authors' attempt to chart the currents of satire. If they have
not always avoided eddies and whirlpools in the way of their so II hazardous"
journey, they have nevertheless struggled to make so protean a subject as
satire give up its various shapes, voices, impulses. The trouble is that satire's
persuasive voice is so protean-fierce as fire, bland as still water, sweeter than
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honey, rough as a cob, and so it is no wonder if it should seem to slip,
occasionally, from the pen of anyone who would dare so sweeping a treatment
as is to be found in this study. The authors do recognize the elusiveness of
their subject, do try to do justice to it not only in theory, but also in theme
and practice. After their introduction, and the welcome emphasis in it on what
they teIm the essential, "innate quality," of bumanitas in the best kinds of
satire, we are given three chapters on "Intention: Satiric Mode of Feeling" j
"Shape and Order: 'How a Modern Satire Should be Made'''; U Apotropaic
Visions: Satiric Tone and Meaning" j then come three chapters on II Religious
Satire," U Political Satire," "Satire of Manners." As perhaps can be seen from
these headings, however, there is inherent in the attempt to be both general
and specific a good deal of overlapping, with all the possibilities of repetitiveness thereby inherent. Some of these possibilities are realized, especially towards the end.
In spite of my frequent irritation with the diction of the book (its use, for
me, of such an anachronistic patois as "integrated persons," "communal man,"
"self-realization and communal needs," "potential for social understanding "),
my distaste for its frequent banalities (" To perform well artistically means to
write well both aesthetically and intellectUally, to entertain and yet to strike
appropriate targets," p. 209j "Dryden's case against Achitophel, a cumulative
one, impresses It_a complete sentence on p. 78; "language and style ... and the
tone in which they are conveyed become measures of persuasion;" "If satire
is to be applicable for all times. then its occasional or historical allusions may
have to be annotated for later generations," p. 112), my reservations about
some of its judgments (" When ... we look back at the narrator of A Modest
Proposal. we do not see him except as a murky, disturbing presence," p. 88;
"Rochester [in A Satire against Reason and Mankind] has a powerful theme
to convey, but he fails to make it more than superficially moving, for his
rhetoric overpowers ra.ther than supports conviction," p. 56-one wonders here
if this may not have been a deliberate stratagem on Rochester's part), the
book is still to be recommended-mainly to graduate students and generalists
rather than to experts in the field. Too much is covered that is already
covered elsewhere. too many readings offered that are to be found, in more
complex fonn, elsewhere. A charting of the currents is offered, not a sounding
of the depths.
AUBREY L. WILLIAMS
University Of Florida

Acts of Inclusion: Studies Bearing on an Elementary Theory of Romanticism by
Michael G. Cooke. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979.
Pp. xx + 289. $18.50.
Acts of Inclusion is not a book that displays great intellectual energy.
It has some good passages, and many felicitously worded sentences, but its
total effect is, for some reason, not compelling. I will review some of its merits
and weaknesses in an attempt to identify the key deficiency..
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Although I am not at ease with simple periodization,l. I accept the fact that
most scholars find "Romanticism I~ a useful historical term. Still, I believe that
Cooke's use of the word (as in the following passage) goes beyond hypostasis, to
the borders of personification. II The silences of 11 Wordsworth's" The Thorn,"
he says, "are reminiscent of the besetting silence of romanticism when it comes
face to face with consequences, in the ultimate moment of recognition and
responsibility" (p. 104). More conventionally naive is the assertion that the
romantic period II is a veritable watershed between the medieval and the modern
order" (p.90).
But this is not the main problem with the book, and there is much richness
of detail to compensate for the schematic sense of history" that it reveals. There
are good passages on Antony and Cleopatra (p. 87), on "Christabel" (p. 99),
on" Ode to Autumn" (p. 117), on La Nouvelle Helofse (p. 167), on The Prelude
(p. 204), among others. A passage from Don Juan U has a severely cryptic
quality and is full of images yearning to be heard .... it would seem that the poem
gets larger, as by authorial commentary, not only to encompass a polyglot universe in a single space, but also to enunciate the wealth of implication in that
universe's single objects" (p. 237). This is good writing. "We might delight
in its unplotted ease, indeed we do so, until there comes home to us a sense of
its unboundedness. It is hard not to pull back at the intersection of spontaneity
and infinity" (p. 227). This is authoritative. "The things we describe as
spontaneous, as opposed to laborious, are the things that coincide with our
preferences, which after all constitute limitations as much as strengths" (p.
228). The ·commentary on Byron, an author with whom Cooke is, of course,
very much at home, is generally strong and mature.
There are also bad elements and bad passages in the book: facile antitheses"The principle of power yields to the power of principle" (p. 88); a
spasmodic colloquialism-" sucker" used twice as a verb (p. xvii, p. 93); an embarrassingly condescending report of a classroom scene (p. 148); levels of diction
so mixed as to produce rhetorical chimeras (" There is in this a quiet stroke of
genius that it would be well to highlight," p. 180); generalizations with a strong
family resemblance .to cliches (" Perhaps the feminine is a power as impalpable,
as ubiquitous, as irresistible as the wind" [po 183]); and the occasioIllaI epigraph
to a chapter, mercifully but coyly attributed to U Anon." (" Romanticism is the
only major movement that has given its basic impulses and aspirations a plenary
indulgence, and at the same time a stem critique. Anon." [po -186]).
It is all the more surprising, then, to encounter a passage of such intellectual
and verbal power as the following, occurring, at that, in the context of an
argument on synecdoche and fragmentation that lies close to the central
concerns of the book: one wonders why someone capable of such strong style
should so often slip into dullness. II Shelley reintegrates Orpheus into the
romantic scheme by terming language I a perpetual Orphic song,' thus overcoming
the piecemeal temporal effect of the root story. No, fragmentation is problematical even at the level of synecodoche .... it admits the existence of the rest,
but by a coercive homogeneity denies the range and character substance
1 The obvious reference here is to Hans Robert Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als
Provokation (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 144-57 et passim.
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of what goes beyond it. At bottom, Blake's 'The T yger' works as a poem about
the poignant insanity of a man who truly sees nothing but parts, whose vision
is a fearfully unqualified and unrelieved synecdoche, affecting alike the Creator
and the Tyger" (pp. 222-23).
Fragmentation is what this book desires to avoid: through a stragetic generosity
that seeks to extend each idea into ,3. principle, or spread the resonances of each
fact until they broaden into a concept, it attempts over and over again to make
generality out of the particular, ror at least to cast every observation into
the most general form in which it can be expressed. These tendencies in his
own writing Cooke attributes to the romantics, calling them" acts of inclusion."
U The
quest for fullness of recognition may be associated with the fonn
of the epic, and we may tum now tiD Byron's use of that fonn as another act of
inclusion" (p. 219). But the acts of inclusion are notably Cooke's own: too
often, they consist in the blurring of boundaries between the specific and the
general to produce pseudo-concepts. In De Quincey, U analysis of everyday
becomes apocalypse, and awareness of singularity becomes a promise of catholicity"
(p. 257). On the same page, "very few people have charged Charles Lamb
with an apocalyptic subjectivity, but even he shows germane interests in his
prose. His essay on 'The Sanity of True Genius' makes him a spokesman
for such subjectivity, as he turns what society might see as eccentric lines of
personality into the most fundamental pattern of human potentiality. In this
light, we might also see in the' Dissertation on Roast Pig' a light-hearted instance
of the romantic taste for new developments or new revelation."
Another typical sentence, at the end of a long section on romantic criminality:
"The romantic period, whatever sort of social action it purveys, is orientated
toward consequences rather than punishment" (p. 103). Cooke seems to
think that you accomplish something simply by moving the lens back to focus on a
larger area so that you no longer have to' account for the things that fall in the
smaller area; that a wide word (" consequences") will automatically explain
what a narrow one (" punishment") 'did not. But the new categories would
have to be more compelling rather than merely more inclusive to make them
interesting, to give us a different grip on the subject. What vitiates a book that
contains much good writing is, I have said, a tendency to read a feature of
the author's own style, an "inclusiveness" that is too often only approximation,
into its subject-matter: but an approach to thinking that itself lacks form cannot
provide a satisfactory model for organization in the material to which it is
applied.
"
laVING MASSEY

State University of New York at BUffalo

Sexuality and Feminism in Shelley by Nathaniel Brown. Cambridge, Mass. and
London, England: Harvard University Press; 1979. Pp. 298. $17.50.
The first half of this book provides a competent, well-written summary
of Shelley'S concept of "civilized sex"; the second half insists that this concept
is feminist. It is not. Hence the title of the book is a misnomer and Nathaniel
Brown's argument is specious.
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Brown begins with a careful description of Shelley's Discourse on Love, rightly
emphasizing its centrality to Shelley's theories of love, sexuality and the status
of women. He details Shelley's hostility to homosexuality, libertinism, and
prostitution and his celebration of a liberated sexuality for both men and women
that involves the intellectual and emotional as well as the physical self. Brown
correctly insisrts that Shelley frequently uses explicitly sexual imagery in his
poetry to mark the moments of climactic union between loving minds and bodies.
That Shelley's obsessive imagery of rising, trembling, panting, sinking, falling,
expiring is sexual will surprise no one familiar with the criticism of Shelley's
poetry published in the last two decades. However, Brown does extend dus
material in one interesting way. He argues that Shelley saw Greek love culminating not in the homosexuality he abhorred but rather in an intensely emotional
"spontaneous orgasm." He further suggests that such orgasms occur at the
climaxes (pun intended) of "Indian Serenade," "Epipsychidion," and" Ode to the
West Wind." VVhile no one would doubt that the imagery of these poems
derives from sexual experiences, and particularly from wet dreams, it seems
odd that Brown never suggests or explores their most likely source: the adolescent
male fantasies accompanying masturbation. That masturbation lies behind such
episodes is supported by the accounts that Brown himself included concerning the
wide-spread sexual activity at Eton when Shelley was there, including "onanism,
mutual masturbation and ... orgies of naked boys in bed together" (142). Nonetheless, it is possible that the intense, sensitive and eroticised adolescent Shelley
experienced spontaneous orgasm 01ll occasion and made this experience an
emblem of the most purified sexuality that he later associated with Greek love
and Platonic eros.
Brown's claim that Shelley was a feminist rests on Ius advocacy of androgyny.
Shelley believed that women should be given the same liberal education and
sexual freedom as men. A woman should become, in the terms Shelley develops in
On Love, the" antitype," the perfect correspondent to the ideal" prototype" that
a man projects of his future perfected self. Brown argues ardently that such
sympathetic identification bet\Veen the sexes leads to a condition of androgyny,
the ,highest feminist idea] of total equality between the sexes. But we need
to look more critically at exactly what androgyny means for Shelley. As Ius own
term "antitype" implies, androgyny is for Shelley a projection of the male
self into a female form. The male prototype appropriates female characteristics
to become the antitype. Such an appropriation is pure narcissism, a process of
male ego-gratification that has little to do \vith a genuine respect for women as
independent human beings.
That Shelley's androgynous ideal is essentially male is seen most clearly in
The Revolt Of Islam, a work that Brown incredibly caBs "the most powerful
feminist poem in the language and ... the most thoroughly grounded in the realities
of the woman question" (181). Brown bases this assertion on the fact that in
this poem the female protagonist Cyn'thna leads a political revolt that succeeds
briefly in overwhelming the tyrant and initiating a time of universal peace and
love. But Brown ignores the fact that the ideal Cynthna serves is embodied in the
poem as exclusively male. Laon is the Serpent/Morning Star, a radiant form
beside which, at the end of the first Canto, Cynthna remains but a cloaked "sha-
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dow." And Cynthna consistently portrays herself as totally dependent on Laon:
she is his pupil, she sings bis songs (1. 1040), she feels she must prove her
"worth" to him (1. 506), her powers derive entirely from his ideas and rhetoric.
As the" female mind" (1. 973), she cannot create her own utopian visions;
instead, her role is to inspire his revolutionary zeal and to be absolutely loyal
to his ideals (significantly, her visions are born from sleep, from her "unconscious" mind, ,,,,hilc his arc consciously and deliberately created). Shelley's
"feminism" extends only to the rhetorical question: "Can man be free if
,,,oman be a slave?" (1. 1045). He envisions a world 'where women are educated
and sexually liberated, but only for the purpose of becoming more satisfying
intellectual, emotional and sexual companions for men; he does not grant them
autonomy or the capacity to lead without male guidance. In dedicating this poem
to Mary Godwin Shelley as his "companion," Shelley directly invoIced her
mother's argument in A Vindication of the Rights of lVoman that rational
women would make better companions for men. For Mary Wollstonecraft, such
rhetoric was necessary to \vin the sympathetic attention of a male audience. In the
mouth of a man, the affirmation of a woman's social role as "companion" to a
man has patriarchal overtones.
It is critical to see that Cynthna can lead a revolution only-and literally-in
the name of Laon; she is kno"\VIl to her followers as "Laone." And when
Laon sacrifices himself that she may flee to America and start a new era
of love and peace, Cynthna instead races to join Laon on his funeral
pyre, choosing to die with him. Thus The Revolt of Islmn is a male fantasy of
feminism: the completely sympathetic woman is so entirely identified with the
male ego that she cannot survive apart from him. That this version of androgyny
is but a subtler form of male sexism has been cogently argued in "The Politics
of Androgyny" by Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi and the responses to tlus essay
published in the 1974 volume of TVomen's Studies, an influential document in the
development of contemporary feminist thought which Brown does not mention.
Moreover, to call The Revolt of Isla1J1 a feminist utopia, as Bro"\VIl does,
is to misread completely that genre as it has developed from Charlotte Perkins
Gilman's Herland (1915) to Marge Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time
(1976) and Sally Miller Gearhart's The Wanderground (1978). Authentic
feminist utopias depict a world where women are free of male domination and
exploitation, either because men do not live there (as in Herland and The
TVanderground) or because the society is genuinely gender-free. In the utopian
commUluty of Mattapoisett depicted in Woman on the Edge of Time, children
are born from breeders and males and females share equally in breast-feeding,
parenting, work, military defense, and homosexual and heterosexual love. In
contrast, Shelley's utopias present women only as soul-mates; and his affirmation
of free-love, while extended to women (he encouraged Mary to have sex with
Thomas Hogg), is primarily a male adolescent fantasy. Mary Wollstonecraft,
for -all that A Vindication directly inspired Shelley's concept of the woman
as an educated companion, did not there advocate free love; her rationally and
affectionately united men and women were monogamous.
A feminist analysis of Shelley's thought and life would have to consider
several issues that Brown ignores. First, what were Shelley's concepts of ahild-
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rearing, parenting, and the family? Shelley was vehemently opposed to birthcontrol and fathered at least six children before he was thirty. Beyond asserting
that Shelley affirmed the" joys of parenthood H (197), Brown offers no evidence
that Shelley took the responsibilities of a parent seriously. Indeed, as we know
from Mary Shelley, the day after their daughter Clara died, Shelley left his
grieving wife at the Hoppner's and went to discuss poetry with Byron. Secondly,
how did Shelley treat the women with whom he was emotionally involved? Shelley's
relationships "\vith his first wife Harriet Westbrook (whom he abandoned when
she failed to live up to his ideal antitype), with Elizabeth Hitchener (whose reputation he destroyed, whose financial ruin he caused, and whom he repeatedly
insulted after they parted), and \vith .Mary Shelley (whose "frigidity" and
emotional distance from him were caused primarily by his callous disregard
for her feelings toward their two dying children and his numerous mistresses)none of these relationships shows a genuine respect for women that could be
called feminist in any meaningful sense of the term. Nor does Brown explore
what is perhaps the most fascinating area of Shelley's relationships with women:
his powerful Oedipal ties with his beautiful mother and his intensely close adolescent bonding with his look-alike sister Elizabeth. The latter relationship in
particular is a more likely psychological origin for Shelley's explicit brothersister incest fantasies in Tbe Revolt of Islam and Prometbeus Unbound than the
ideal of sympathetic identification that Brown emphasizes. Despite Br-own's
arguments, this book does not seriously challenge the traditional view of Shelley
as an adolescent narcissist who wished to surround himself with a harem of
adoring female versions of himself: intellectually and sexually liberated women,
true, but women whose ultimate function was to provide c-onstant and sympathetic
stimulation f-or bis faculties.
Had Nathaniel Brown entitled his book Sbelley's Attitudes to Lo·ve, Sexuality
and Women, he would have given us a useful compendium of Shelley's thought
on these subjects. By trying to cast Shelley as "an ideal type of humanity,
beaconing the way to the future" of androgynous unisexuality (226) and as a
"welcome inspiration" to the feminist movement (180), Brown does both Shelley
and the feminists a disservice. Shelley's androgyny does Dot transcend "patriarchal definitions of gender," as Brown claims; it only subsumes the woman more
completely under the psyche of the man.
ANNE

K.

MELLOR

Stanford University

Victorian Fantasy by Stephen Prickett. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979, Pp. xvi
257. $17.50.

+

Victorian Fantasy "attempts to describe a variety of writers [who] tried to
extend and enrich ways of perceiving ',reality' by a variety of non-realistic
techniques that included nonsense, dreams, visions, and the creation of other
worlds ... not in opposition to the prevailing realism, but in addition to it" (xiii,
xv). Prickett's main task, then, is one of practical criticism within an historically
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defined field "\vhile his clear subsidiary task is the theoretical one of justifying
his perceptions of historical boundaries and of "the prevailing realism." Although
his success as practical critic is greater than his success as theoretician, the volume
as a \vhole nonetheless offers much of value.
"The Evolution of a Word," Prickett's opening chapter, does not so much
define fantasy as offer some glimpses into the way the term was used from the
Romantics to the Moderns, particularly in opposition to "imagination." (Prickett
is well known for his work on Coleridge and Wordsworth.) '" Imagination'
and 'fantasy' had come to stand for two sides of the Victorian psyche: its
sacred and profane loves ... light and dark" (6, 9). Rather than proceed theoretically, Prickett suggests that "it is in fact much more rewarding to see this
polarity of fantasy and imagination straightforwardly in terms of literary genre"
(43) and he strives to organize the rest of his book accordingly. "Christmas at
Scrooge's" primarily contrasts Thomas Hood's Miss Kilmansegg and ber Precious
Leg with Dickens' A Cbrist711(ls Carol, the first (which is only arguably a fantasy)
being presented as social satire while the second is presented as psychological
exploration. "Dreams and Nightmares" concerns presumably unrepressed fantasies, both the non-sexud and the sexual. Although Beardsley's Under tbe Hill
is obviously sexual, Prickett is clearly mistaken in asserting that l\1ary Shelley's
Frmzkenstein is "[without] brooding metaphysical evil and sexual corruption"
(97) ('" I will be with you on your wedding night,''' the monster swears);
perhaps it is Prickett's failure to see Mary Shelley'S repressed sexuality that induced him to place Frankenstein in this chapter. The following chapter, "Consensus and Nonsense," contrasts the "emotion, nostalgia and sheer buffoonery
[of Lear's nonsense with the] undeviating rationality [Carroll] pushed to its
furthest and wildest extremes" (131). While this oversimplifies (Prickett himself brilliantly shows Lear's etymological accuracy while Carroll's hidden obsession
with death and sexuality is well known), the dichotomy is instructive. "Adults
in Allegory Land" contrasts the "minute detail" of Kingsley's world with the
grand Platonic ideals of the worlds created by George l\1:acDonald, Prickett's
defensible pick as all-time champion fantasist. Finally" Worlds within Worlds"
discusses the fantasies of Kipling and Nesbit, the former capitalizing on his childhood imaginings, the latter bringing out her adult insights, and both writing
ostensibly for children because "the mystery and urgency of other worlds
[had been] dissipated ... by the conventions of Victorian naturalism" (235).
Although somewhat organized to foster theoretical inquiry, this is clearly a
volume of historical scholarship.
One of the great virtues of Victorian Fantasy as literary history is that it
does not confine itself to literature. There is some of the usual discussion of
architecture at Walpole's and Beckford's places and some unusual discussion
of the way the mid-century discovery of dinosaurs transformed the prevailing
images of monstrosity. The authors who are treated at length almost all
generate suggestive parallel treatments of the works of their illustrators. But
there are wealrnesses of historical scholarship from time to time. Although
Prickett recognizes that "so many of the nineteenth-century fantasies ... draw
heavily and in some detail on The Arabian Nights" (217), he ignores that collection and the whole vogue of Oriental tale (like Addison's 1711 "Our Ideas of
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Time ") and instead asserts that CI Suddenly [emphasis mine] fairy stories had
become respectable" (5). Although Gershon Legman's magisterial The Limerick
reports that verse form as early as the fourteenth century (Legman, p. xiv),
Prickett puts the U earliest examples" in 1820 (122). The book, in short, needs
to be read with care.
There is much in Victorian Fantasy to repay careful reading. Like Roger
Sale's Fairy Tales and After, Prickett's volume offers serious and often insightful
criticism of works usually ignored and almost always, when mentioned, slighted.
If one looks for theoretical definitions or historical exhaustiveness, this book
disappoints by its omission of significant treatment of m~tters that ought to fall
under its title concept, the prose of William Morris for example, Medievalism,
Scott's novels, the vogue for vampirism, Peter Pan, and the science fiction of
Doyle and Wells. But there is much here that is unexpected. As part of his
detailed discussion of A Christmas Carol, Prickett observes that IC money as power
is a central theme of Victorian fiction" (57) and that "the will to dominate
rather than money per se is thus the key to Scrooge's character" (58). Contrary to the popular impression that Scrooge undergoes a fundamental conversion, Prickett is shockingly right in observing that
Scrooge's character is not transformed. He retains all his old desire to
shock, startle, and dominate: the purchase of the turkey on Christmas
morning (' the one as big as the man '), the ~mrprise visit to his nephew,
and the raising of Bob Crachit's wages all have the authentic drama of the
old Scrooge. What bas been transfonned is his feeling of identity with
mankind: his realization that what he has lost and needs most is love.
(60-61)

Time 'and again Prickett turns out an insight not in opposition to the usual
wisdom but in addition to it. In giving serious readings to Lear's limericks and
dwelling on the meanings of monsters, in distinguishing boldly the exuberant
fantasies from the self-destroying ones, in reviewing major authors and viewing
minor ones, Prickett does a service. He overstates, for example, when he claims
that IC Nonsense constituted an entire alternative aesthetic, making possible a
radically different kind of art" (146), but he is right to force our attention on
the sense of Nonsense and right to argue that without understanding Fantasy
we cannot understand the Victorians.
ERIC S. RABKIN
University of Michigan

Lyric Time: Dickinson and tbe Limits of Genre by Sharon Cameron. Baltimore
and London: Tbe Jobns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Pp. x
280. $15.00.

+

The poetry of Emily Dickinson has been subjected to critical scrutiny from
many different angles. First seen as a literary curiosity admired for its quaintness
'I
and its differences from that of her contemporaries, her poetry has been taken up
I by a variety of apologists and interpreters, from those who tried to make her a
precursor of the Imagists, to the New Critics, who delighted in her ambiguities

184

BOOK REVIEWS

and paradoxes, to the Freudians, who found hidden longings and hatreds, to the
Existentialists, who found angst, to :the biographical critics, who foun.(l a recoTd
of her family relationships. The cumulative effect of over a half century of
criticism has been generally good, however, as we have come to recognize
Dickinson for the major poet she is. Recent criticism has been less at pains
to explain or apologize for her poetry and more concerned with penetrating its
structures. Among those recent critics who have skillfully dealt with the work as
a whole while at the same time giving close readings of individual poems are
David Porter and Robert Weisbuch. Weisbuch, for example, in Emily Dickinson's Poetry (1975) has examined Dickinson's usc of typology to suggest the
various and multiple patterns of meaning in the poems.
Sharon Cameron has built upon (and gracefully acknowledged) tlns previous
criticism, adding to it the insights yielded by .a deft and brilliant application of
phenomenological criticism, particularly the writings of Derrida, Lacan, and
'Nittgenstein, to suggest that Dickinson is a phenomenalist poet, "who argues the
connection between presence, its loss, and the restorative powers of language."
Actually, Cameron is interested not only in Dickinson, with whose work she
is thoroughly familiar; she is a theoretician as well as a practical critic, and
Lyric Time asks to be read simultaneously as three different books: (1) as a
study of Dickinson's poems themselves, using close readings and generalizing about
the poet's various techniques and strategies; (2) as an application of phenomenalist
critical theory to Dickinson's work, and an attempt to develop and refine that
body of theory; and (3) as an attempt to develop a theory of the lyric poem,
using examples from the English seventeenth century, the Romantic period, and
modern poetry, as well as the poetry of Dickinson. She manages to carry off
this balancing act and end up with a challenging book about temporality in
Dickinson's work that leads outward to an exploration of similar questions concerning the lyric genre. Chapter Five, in fact, is concerned mainly with these
questions, and is actually a prolegomenon to a future study.
One of Cameron's strengths is her ability to read a controversial and difficult
poem closely and to weave that reading into her larger argument. One of the
best examples of this is her reading of "My Life had stood-a Loaded Gun."
She regards two of the generally accepted readings as inadequate: one interprets
the speaker ,as God's marksman who guards Him at night; the other makes the
"Master" the speaher's lover, whom she guards with jealous fury, seemingly
preferring violence to sexuality. But because the last stanza is so puzzling and
contradictory Cameron argues that the poem cannot make sense either as
religious allegory or as the depiction of an erotic relationship. What she detects
in the poem is a dialectic of rage, suggested by the last stanza, which expresses a conflict between "identity," conceived of as violence, and a conception
of life as rage. This enigmatic stanza scrutinizes the speaker's own fury, and
views the speaker-gun as the agent of death rather ~han the object of it.
The discussion of this poem lies at the center of the second chapter, subtitled
"The Dialectic of Rage," which examines a group of Dickinson poems that
seek a way out of time and the conflicts within time: essentially sexuality and
death. Into these poems a disruptive voice enters, attempting to prevent the
convergence of these two forces by manifesting itself in the form of rage.
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In this type of poem rage becomes presence, a means of escape from temporality. Escape from temporality is the governing idea of the book, and, of
course, of Dickinson's poetry as well. Her desire to depart from the temporal
order into "Immortality" has been frequently noticed, and Cameron sees this
dialectic between time and immortality working in a number of different ways,
including the poets of grief and loss. She goes further and provides speculations
on this tendency in more conventional lyric poets, from Marvell in the
seventeenth century through Blake, Keats, Yeats, and others. The loss of a
world outside of time is a loss that Dickinson in an intense and striking way
attempts to recover, and Cameron sees this as an abiding impulse in the lyric
geIlIe.
Her subtly developed arguments are shaped and informed throughout by a
critical sensibility attuned to Derrida and Wallace Stevens; many of her happier
turns of phrase contain Stevensian echoes or cadences. The book is not for the
casual reader; it builds carefully on the explorations of Dickinson's inner
structures done recently by Weisbuch and Porter, but it takes some interestingand justifiable-risks in speculating and offering hypotheses about the nature and
function of the lyric seen as a struggle with time.
DONALD BARLOW STAUFFJo~R

State Univ.,·sity of New York at Albany

The Achievement of Margaret Fuller by Margaret Vanderhaar Allen. University
Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979: Pp. 225. $13.50.
The Transcendentalist belief in II life as art," a dangerous concept derived
from Goethe's "self-culture," often dispersed the energies of fine minds like
Bronson Alcott, Jones Very and (I would add, Allen would not) Margaret
Fuller. Cultivating a complex personality's many facets works against achieving
excellence in anyone field, unless one possesses the genius of a Goethe. Allen
believes Fuller did achieve multiple excellence as a social reformer, political
thinker, essayist, creative writer, feminist, critic and conversationalist. While
these last two claims have some validity, the others are excessive. To say
Fuller "ranks with the best writers of her age as an epigrammatist" is, considering II her age" included Dickinson, Emerson and Thoreau, to succumb to
the enthusiasm of an advocate.
But, despite occasional hyperbole. Allen has produced one of the most solid
interpretations of Fuller's thought. Allen has read all the pertinent material,
condensed it admirably, and presented the most relevant in a highly readable
style. The focus on Fuller's relationship to Emerson and Goethe is sharp, and
I the discussion of Fuller's aesthetic use of the garden motif, of her contribution
: as a critic, and of her views on nature and civilization is scholarly and succinct.
I In addition to being a dependable overview of Fuller's achievement, Allen's
! Acbievement also offers original insights, the chief being 'her startling and
, persuasive argument that Fuller was a precursor of Walt Whionan as well as of
: Susan B. Anthony. M.ost of all, Allen has reached her main goal, the principal

,
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aim of the half-dozen Fuller studies published this past decade-to dispel the
distorting mists that swirled up around Fuller after her death in 1850, a fog
of misinterpretation that her Memoirs, edited by Channing, Emerson and Clarke,
contributed much to create.
This is necessary work. Both the plaster cast and the Gothic image must
be smashed before an accurate reconstruction of the truths of Fuller's life
and mind can take place. The methodology by which these truths are to be
revealed will have to be that of sophisticated feminism because, for all
her limitations, Fuller will continue to be an intriguing personality not only
for what she accomplished but because of the age in which she flourished, an
era when college doors were closed to women and when Blackstone classed
women with minors and idiots before the law. Allen and other recent critics
have now corrected the vision of the past; they have prepared the way for the
next phase of Fuller criticism which will answer even more fundamental
questions and make specific contributions to the history and theory of woman's
education, the definition of feminine psychology, and the clearer understanding
of cultural paradigms.
One example should suffice. Everyone mentions how Fuller's father, Timothy,
a strict disciplinarian, forced a course of study upon Fuller to make her a
paragon of intellectual erudition, a regimen that Fuller blamed for her frequent
headaches, fainting spells and sleepwalking. Some fault Timothy for his
harshness, but Allen points out that Fuller would not have become Fuller without
this education.
Recent criticism has determined the facts of this anecdote; the next wave
of Fuller criticism will be able to interpret such questions as: if feminists like
Allen are correct in stating that women think differently from men, then what
sort of education should Fuller have had, and how should it have been conducted? Had she followed the same course of study, but under her mother's
tutelage as Fuller's heroine .Madame De Stael had, would that have spared her
physical and psychological torment? \iVould reading Virgil late at night with her
mother instead of with her father have prevented those sexual nightmares about
wild horses trampling her? To what extent is her later obsession with cold male
figures like Emerson, Goethe, and John Nathan explained by her close but cold
relationship with her father? Is her marriage to the sweet-tempered, selfeffacing Ossoli a reverse mirror image of her parents' marriage? Indeed, since
Fuller's frequent illnesses parallel her mother's behavior, waS Fuller following
a role model of womanhood or perhaps manifesting a secret sympathy with her
mother (Sarah Margaret Fuller did drop her first name, thus sharing the same
name with her mother)? Lastly, how abnormal were Fuller's illnesses set against
the norm of her times, a standard of female illness that has been recorded in
literature from Austen to Wharton and developed thematically in Grand
Opera? These are topics ,,,,hich the next phase of Fuller criticism will investigate,
and that exciting next phase of feminist criticism has been made possible
through the efforts of critics like Allen.
HENRY

TV Clyne State University
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Tbe Poetic Achievement of Ezra Pound by Michael Alexander. Berkeley and
Los Angele" University of California Press, 1979. Pp. 247. $14.95.
Until tIus book appeared, there was no adequate, up-to-date critical introduction to the poetic oeuvre of Ezra Pound. The works 'of Hugh Kenner
(1951), G. S. Fraser (1960), and M. L. Rosenthal (1960) served well in their
day, but could say little or nothing about the post-Pisan Cantos. Among the
more recent introductory essays, the pamphlets of William Van O'Connor
(1963), Marion Montgomery (1970), and Jeannette Lander (1971) are nugatory;
the books of Christine Brooke-Rose (1971), Sister Bernetta Quinn (1972), and
Donald Davie (1975) are, respectively, too precious, too inaccurate, and too
advanced to be useful to beginning students; and Peter Brooker's A Student's
Guide to the Selected Poems of Ezra Pound (1979), though an accurate and
intelligent reference companion, does nOl: provide the broad discussion of issues
and attitudes without which many readers find it difficult to orient themselves
to Pound's poetry. l\!Iichael Alexander aims, in The Poetic Achievement of
Ezra Pound, "to present, in a manageable volume, an introductory critical survey
of Pound's verse as a whole, including the translations·" (p. 13). Alexander has
fulfilled this aim superbly. His book is now the best available general introduction
to the poet and his fascinating but sometimes inaccessible work. Alexander's ABC
may be confidently recommended to any reader who seeks initiation into the
Ezratic mysteries.
The 247-page format gives Alexander more elbow-room than was enjoyed by
the authors of most of the books named above. Alexander is able to digress,
recapitulate, crack a joke, or spend thirteen pages on an early poem if the
discussion requires it. Instead of one pinched chapter on The Cantos, he has
the disposition of five, or more than a hundred pages. As a result, Alexander's
introduction seems less hurried and more judicious than most. The reader
does not feel bustled along by a guide who is glancing at his watch and worrying
about lunch.
Alexander addresses himself primarily to "an uninitiated British reader," onc
to whom Pound may seem not only difficult but unutterably foreign (p. 14).
To orient such a reader, Alexander compares Pound frequently to the classic
authors at the heart of the British school and university curriculum: Shakespeare,
Donne, Jonson, Herrick, Marvell, Milton, Dryden, Pope, Wordsworth, Keats,
Swinburne, Hopkins, Yeats. American readers, unaccustomed to thinking of
Pound in such a context, will find these comparisons novel and challenging. Yet
nothing in Alexander's exposition \vill strike a literate but uninitiated American
student as inaccessible or incomprehensible. Alexander has an excellent grasp
of American history and culture, and a fine ear for American speech. His
perspective and his style are, in the best sense, transatlantic, to resurrect a term
that Pound's generation found useful.
Alexander has lived long and intimately with his subject. His knowledge
of Pound's work is familiar yet clear-eyed, affectionate yet accurate. By no means
an uncritical idolater of the Master, Alexander concedes some of the most
damaging charges made against Pound's work by unsympathetic critics. But
Alexander has an unshakeable conviction of Pound's poetic merits, which
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he elucidates with eloquence, warmth, and wit. In other words, he maintains
critical balance without losing enthusiasm, no mean feat in the tipsy world of
Pound studies.
The unity of Pound's work, for Alexander, is post-romantic in nature, a unity
of the poet's temperament and responsiveness to emotional experience. Alexander
ascribes Pound's disjunctive techniques, for example, not to the self-conscious
intellectual program of modernist aesthetics, but to something more fundamental

in Pound's very make-up: "Pound's obliquity, though it has to do with his
dislike for obvious conceptualization, is the semi-dramatic strategy natural to a
sensibility inwardly in awe of life, and the product of a temperament possessed of
deep instincts, though normally reticent in their expression. The mysteriousness
and refinement in Pound is not an affectation, in spite of his striking of attitudes;
it is rather that his inner life was not for direct export" (p. 43). TIlls is a
more generous (and British) diagnosis of Pound's odd habits of mind than is
Herbert Schncidau's suggestion, in Paideuma for Spring 1976, that the poet wrote
out of something very close to an aphasic mental disorder.
Alexander speaks with special sympathy and insight about Pound's translations. On this subject, the critic has particular authority, since he Illmself has
translated much Old English poetry, including the Penguin Beowulf. Pound's
Seafarer has obviously been an inspiration to Alexander, who devotes thirteen
excellent pages to it, concluding that it is "the most powerful realization of
Old English poetry we are ever likely to have" (p. 78). Elsewhere in his book
Alexander writes perceptively about Cathay, Homage to Sextus Propertius, The
Confucian Odes, and' The Women Of Trachis.
Alexander chooses not to discuss Pound's prose writings, lest such discussion blur
his focus on the poetry. This decision is justifiable, but leads to the book's only
major omission: that of a concise summary and evaluation of Pound's economic
and political beliefs. That Alexander is capable of such a summary seems clear;
his passing references to economic and political subjects in The Cantos are
informed and accurate, and he provides elsewhere in the book an excellent synopsis of Pound's religious philosophy. But he does not offer a comparable account of
Pound's social philosophy, some explanation of which is badly needed by most
uninitiated readers.
Nevertheless, The Poetic Achievement of Ezra Pound is itself no small critical
achievement. Because it will be of great use to future students of the poet's work,
tIus book ought to be put into a paperback edition as soon as possible.
HUGH WlTEMEYER

The University of New Mexico

The jl,10ment of "Scrutiny" by Francis Mullhern. London: New Lcft Books, 1979.
Pp. J J 1. $24.00.
F. R. Leavis' most influential critical work originally appeared in Scrutiny,
the quarterly he edited. This journal was also, as Francis Mulhern writes in
his new book, the organizer and bearer of an important" ideological formation."
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Leavis' was only one voice among many, although the most brilliant. Mulhern's
booK brings us the whole chorus: D. W. Harding, Wilfrid Mellers, L. C.
Knights, G. H. Bantock, and others.
Mulhern's concern is not chiefly with Leavis but rather with Leavisism as a
force within twentieth century English culture. Its in1luence persists but
Mulhern limits his account to the lifespan. of Scrutiny (1932-53). He has performed a kind of political-cultural ·autopsy not so mum to honor Scrutiny as to
make clear its "material specificity." The purpose of such a critique can only
be to liberate present-day literary and social thought.
The author's solicitude for the present infonns his historical critique at every
turn. He is a Marxist and an editor of the London-based quarterly, New Left
Review. Like others associated with that journal, notably Perry Anderson and
Terry Eagleton, Mulhern sees Leavisism, despite its anti-Marxism, as more important for present-day Marxists than the simplicities of explicitly Marxist
criticism of the English 1930s.
The Moment of " Scrutiny" has three major sections, sandwiched by an introduction on the Cambridge intellectual milieu in which the journal was conceived
and a restrospect at the end. The first of these sections, and to my mind the
best, takes up Scrutiny in the bold, brave days if its youth, up to 1939. The
second part considers the journal's program for educational reform during the
war years. Mulhern writes well, in this section, about the political-cultural
meaning of Leavis' turning in the 1940s from poetry to criticism of the novel.
The third section deals with the post-war period (1945-53), during which
Scrutiny's very success was the condition of its dissolution.
The first part defines the sense of cultural crisis which Scrutiny's contributors shared. In reaction, Mulhern writes, "the journal elaborated a binary
discourse that united a technicist conception of 'civilization' (the domain of
quantities an~ means) with a complementarily idealist conception of 'culture'
(the domain of qualities, values and ends). The' community' so affinned was a
spiritual entity. incarnated not in social structures but in 'tradition.'" In this
formulation Scrutiny's key words-" culture," "community," ",tradition "-are
brought together and illuminated by the conjunction.
From this analysis follows Mulhern's conclusion, which is his book's main point:
U the principal effect of this discourse, manifest equally in its utterances and its
practical policy, was a categorial dissolution of politics." The purpose of
The Moment of "Scrutiny" is to lift that repression, to make politics once
more possible.
Mulhern places Scrutiny in the context of twentieth century European social
thought, most notably in relation to classical sociology and to the romantic interest
in national culture (Volksgeist). Previously, especially in the writing of Raymond
Williams, Leavisism has been presented exclusively in English terms, as a twentieth
century continuation of the "organicist" critical tradition of Burke. Coleridge,
Arnold, and T. S. Eliot. I don't think Mulhern is persuasive in locating Leavisism
on the map of European modernism, but he does reveal in his attempt the
openness of the new Marxist criticism in English to Continental influence.
I I This influence is evident in Mulhern's attempt, as he says, to "elucidate the
~ i workings of (Scrutiny's) discourse." As in recent French theories of the text,
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Mulhern sees ideological struggle in terms of a clash of discourses, or discursive practices. The discourse as such is more important than the individual
critic-hero Leavis who gives it expression.
The most important difference between the Marxism of Raymond Williams and
Arnold Kettle and that of the young English Althusserians has heen the latter's
philosophical and theoretical rigor. This presents a problem in the ideological
critique of Leavisism, which was so militantly anti··theoretical. The problem was
canvassed in a famous exchange in 1937 between Rene Wellck and Leavis on the
relation between literary criticism and philosophy. Wellck wrote at that time:
" I could wish that you had stated your assumptions morc explicitly and defended
them systematically." In reply Leavis reaffirmed his idea of criticism as involving
acts of " realization" which have nothing to do with explicit norms or theoretical
systems. The argument was dropped, and Mulhern now resumes it.
In what seems to me the most original part of his study Mulhern argues that
Leavis' anti-theoreticism is itself in the service of ra theory, of an ideology which
conceals its premises for strategic reasons. Scrutiny's god-terms, words like
II concreteness II and
"particularity," were not "the names of self-evident data
of perception" but rather were II terms in a discourse ... whose logical substructures were in principle no less 'systematic' or 'abstract' than those of
Marxism or (I. A. Richards') hermeneutics."
What then were the assumptions of Scrutiny's discursive practice? One
was that "the critic could and should achieve unmediated community with his
text, and with his presumed audience, the 'readers of poetry as such.'" The
question of the critic's relation to his audience leads back to social-political
issues. That of the critic's II unmediated community with his text" is more
directly literary.
Mulhern observes that Leavisian criticism does not depend upon definition, as
does, say, that of Yvor Winters. Instead, Leavis' typical gesture was II recognition-recognition, and where appropriate, affirmation of what is immanent in
the concrete literary Vl'Ord." Criticism, on this view, does lIot produce meaning.
Rather. II to criticize was to bear witness to meanings that were already adequately
constituted in the words on the page. needing only to be 'realized' in the consciousness of the reader."
It follows that for Leavis criticism was II a form of intuitionism: specifically,
it consisted in tbe intuition of moral values in literm'y experience." Thisintuitionism
in turn implies other assumptions, as for example about the homogeneity of the
audience, which is necessarily a select few. a veritable Coleridgean clerisy.
Scrutiny's elitism leads out again to politics. The argument is knotty and sometimes elliptical, and I wish Mulhern had allowed himself more space to spell it out
in the crucial chapter entitled II Standards, Currencies and Values." I wish, too,
that Mulhern had been more clear about the connection between Leavis' horror
of cultural disorder and his idealist metaphysics. These objections, however, are
minor. This is a book to be grateful for arid to make one regret the lack of a
comparable study of the two American literary-critical groups which were contempor:aneous with Scrutiny: the New Critics and the New York intellectuals.
MARK

L.

KRUPNICK

The University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
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Theodore Roetbke: An American Romcrntic by Jay Parini. Amherst: University
of Massachusetts Press, 1979. Pp. xi + 208. $12.50.

I

Theodore Roethke schooled his spirit in the marsh and mire, in "the Void,
immediate and terrifying." He is our great poet of the regressive imagination
moving back through "the kingdom of bang and blab" into the "kingdom of
stinks and sighs." Roethke's goal was to recover the first primordial world of
the psyche, to think his body into the vegetal country of greenhouse and far
field, to root himself "in a deep deep yes. In all." Ultimately he wcnt back
because he wanted to go forward, remaking himself in the process. Thus he
descends into the underworld in a poem like" Root Cellar" (" What a congress
of stinks!") in order to reach the tenuous sunlight realm of "Child on Top
of a Greenhouse" (" And everyone, everyone pointing up and shouting!").
Roethke's subject is l'ebirth and metamorphosis, the snake shedding its skin, the
man struggling to regain, in Yeats's phrase, "radical innocence." He could say
playfully that" I've crawled from the mire, alert as a saint ,or a dog." And it is
because he was always coming back into the light that Roethke considered himself one of the poets of affirmation. As he said, "None the Less, in spite
of all the muck -and welter, the dark, the dreck of these poems, I count myself
among the happy poets." Roethke is a poet of Blakean exuberance and his
Collected Poems document the achieved transformation of obsession into joy.
Jay Parini's book on Roethkc as an American Romantic adds to our understanding of Roethkc's poetry and thus represents a solid addition to the critical
literature. Parini's study offers what he calls "a map of Theodore Roethke's
secret planet." He tracks Roethke's poetic development from Open House
(1941) to The Far Field (1964), detailing individual lyrics .'and sequences in
order to isolate major patterns and thus discover the poet's" mythos." Parini's
essential contribution is his reading of Roethke's work ,as an extension of the
literature of Amer.ican Romanticism. He considers Roethke not merely in terms
of his debt to Yeats (and it seems to me that both Roethke and his commentators have overacknowledged his borrowings from "the last Romantic"), but
also as a late descendant of Emerson and YVhitman. For Roethke is finally a
poet of the egotistical sublime, celebrating and moralizing the American landscape, reading nature as "a steady storm of correspondences.," a symbol of the
spirit. Roethke called Reason "that dreary shed, that hutch for grubby
schoolboys," and Parini interprets his plunge into the unconscious as an
internalized quest romance. This enables him to consider Roethke's necessary
pilgrimage in tra,ditional Romantic terms.
Parini is at his best in defining the constellation of images, ideas, and
influences animating Roethke's major sequences. (His book is weakest when
it tries to fit some of the poems into mechanistic, so called "mythic" terms
derived from Joseph Campbell. Must our critics continue to rely on grand,
supposedly universal, obsolete anthropological models?) Parini's irrefutable
argument is that the fact and symbol of his family's greenhouse stands at
the center of Roethke's mature work. The greenhouse was for him at one and
the same time a natural and an artificial world, a place of order and chaos,
generation and decay, He called it "a reality harsher than reality," both
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heaven and hell, a kind of tropics created in the savage climate of Michigan ...." The great moment in Roethke's poetic life is the transition between
his first and second books, the way in whioh he worked out of the strict
aesthetic straitjacket of Open House into the organic flowering of The Lost Son
and Other Poems (1948). The greenhouse is at the heart of the breakthrough.
It first of all gave Roethke an ostensible subject and rooted his work in what
he ~alled "an anguish of concreteness." He would go on to become, in
John Berryman's lovely phrase, "the Garden Master," ,and indeed no poet
has more acutely surveyed the natural growth and degeneration of roots,
weeds, moss, carnations, and orchids. The greenhouse is also linked to two
other discoveries Roethke was making at the same time. Through ,the promptings of Keuneth Burke he began to explore the poetic possibilities of the unconscious, returning to the world of his childhood and thus commencing "the
retrogressive course" of his" hallucinatory dream." At the same time he realized
that the organic process of plants could stand as a metaphor and model for the
poetic enterprise itself, each poem taking on its own intrinsic shape. Thus in
fonnal and expressive terms Roethke became a Romantic poet.
Theodore Roetbke: An American Romantic does not extend or redefine
current notions of Romanticism, but it does place Roethke firmly in a Romantic
ttadition. As such it is a sturdy contribution to the study of Rpethke's poetry.
The Garden Master is himself gone, but this book helps to demonstrate why
his work stands not on the peripheries but at the center of our literature.
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